The Greek crisis has brought to light the strong nexus between the credit risks of European banks and their sovereign. We study this phenomenon in Germany, 
Introduction
In this paper we focus on the time varying correlation between the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of the bonds of major international banks and of sovereign issuers over the period [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . From here onwards, we use the term nexus to define the link between the default risk of a sovereign issuer and the default risk of banks or the reverse.
Recently Acharya et al. (2015) and De Bruyckere et al. (2013) analyze the feedback loops between sovereign risk and bank risk. The direction of causality can run from bank to sovereign risk in countries with sound public finances and weak banking sector or the other way around, i.e. from sovereign to banks, when an over-indebted public sector jeopardizes the solvency of domestic banks. Gennaioli et al. (2014) investigate the repercussions of a sovereign debt crisis on the banking system and on the real economy via the banks' holdings of sovereign debt (assets side). Indeed, the unsustainability of public debt affects sovereign creditworthiness and, depending on the exposure of banks' portfolios to government loans, bank's balance sheets. The overall effects, i.e. the strength of the "nexus", will depend on the degree of portfolio diversification. 1 In this line, it is noteworthy that, in response to the Lehman crisis, governments often provided explicit guarantees to bank bond issuers in order restore transactions on the wholesale funding market (liabilities side). As is well known a sovereign downgrade will increase the cost of funding, which in turn will affect credit availability and economic growth, determining spillovers on credit quality and thus on the default probability of banks (Davies and Ng, 2011, Panetta, 2011) .
Since the inception of the Greek crises in 2010, several papers have attempted to address the issue of contagion from the Greek sovereign bonds to the European sovereign markets and national financial systems. This kind of contagion is far from undisputed, however, as the mechanism behind it is hazy. Mink and De Haan (2016) , for example, find that news about Greek public finance, per se, do not generate abnormal bank stock returns, with the exception of Portuguese, Irish and Spanish banks, while news related to the likelihood of a bail out affect both the European bank abnormal returns and the sovereign bond prices of Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Similarly, Buchel (2013) , analyzing the impact of communications on rescue of indebted countries on PIIGS' CDS and bond yield spreads, find that statements from German, French, EU officials and ECB governing members exert an immediate (asymmetric) influence.
An insignificant economic effect of Greek CDS spread changes on the stock returns of banks of other countries is also detected by Beltratti and Stulz (2017) , who find that shocks from larger countries or multiple peripheral countries, instead, have a substantial impact. According to their analysis the relation between contagion and the holdings of peripheral country bonds by banks from other countries is weak. Similarly Pradigis et al. (2015) , using a corrected Dynamic Conditional Correlation model, and Philippas and Siriopoulos (2013) , using a regime switching model and a time varying copula, do not find an overall contagion effect from the Greek crisis to other countries.
Differently Buchholz and Tonzer (2016) find that in the European Union sovereign credit risks are strictly interconnected for countries belonging both to the core and to the periphery and that the co-movements in credit risk are enhanced by direct links between national banking systems. They also find that the correlation/contagion structure varies across time and countries, requiring therefore a dynamic approach. About the nature of the Greek contagion, GomezPuig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2016) detect both pure and fundamentals-based bond yield spread co-movements. During the European sovereign crisis, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) , instead, find that evidence of contagion is restricted mostly to the peripheral countries.
Our investigation deals with the strength and the nature of the nexus between domestic sovereign and bank bond CDS spreads over the decade 2006-2015. The within country analysis is complemented by cross country (contagion) considerations via the transition variables. The domestic nexus correlation structure varies, at first, according to the dynamics of the Greek-German sovereign bond spread, and later on -in the case of Germany and France -also in reaction to the behavior of the Italian-German sovereign bond spread.
Analyses of the nexus based on standard techniques which posit a priori causality linkages are likely to be distorted during crises since the direction of causality may vary. We implement thus a correlation analysis procedure and -in order to avoid biases due to volatility shifts (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002 , among many others) -we use a dynamic conditional correlation approach: the smooth transmission constant correlation STCC-GARCH of Berben and Jansen (2005) and Silvennoinen and Terӓsvirta (2005) and its two transition functions extension, the DSTCC-GARCH by Sivennoinen and Terӓsvirta (2009) . This paper contributes to, and improves upon, the extant literature on contagion, defined here as a significant increase in the co-movement of the rates of return of the sovereign and bank bonds CDS spreads, in the following ways. First, by focusing on correlation analysis we avoid the indeterminacy of ad hoc causality assumptions. Second, the use of a complex trivariate STCC-GARCH methodology allows to by-pass most of the shortcomings that affect the effectiveness of previous empirical investigations. Indeed, we upgrade the heteroskedasticity consistent procedure of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) by avoiding any ad hoc assumption on the timing of the crisis and the subsequent sub-sample selection bias. Third, we date when correlations among returns increase and, in this way, identify contagion events. Fourth, with the help of the explicit selection of the transition variables, we determine which factor brings about contagion. We avoid in this way the causal indeterminacy of the extreme events/copula contagion analyses of Bae et al. (2003) among others. Finally, we assess both the minimal dimension of the shocks required to generate a reaction of CDS investors (and thus a shift in the nexus) and the speed of their reaction, which reflects the relative heterogeneity of their expectations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the empirical methodology. In Section 3 we focus on the relation between the Greek financial turmoil and the domestic nexuses whereas in Section 4, considering a larger perspective, we include in the analysis the concerns about the sustainability of the Italian public debt as a risk magnifying factor. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
is the rate of change of a sovereign bond CDS, where C is a country index, and , = 1, 2, is the rate of change of a bank bond CDS, where denotes a domestic bank. is a 3x1 vector of residuals ( 1 2 3 )′ such that
where −1 is the relevant information set.
The conditional variance matrix of the residuals has the following time-varying Bollerslev (1990) posits in the CCC-GARCH parameterization that the conditional variance of each residual time series , = 1, … , 3, follows a GARCH(1,1) process and that the correlations are constant. The conditional second moments are thus modeled as
Denoting as a 3x3 diagonal matrix with diagonal elements given by (ℎ ) In this case, at time t the 3x3 conditional correlation matrix can be written as
where 1 and 2 are assumed to be constant 3x3 positive definite correlation matrices. The logistic function is defined as
− is a transition variable with delay d. The coefficient γ and the threshold c determine, respectively, the speed of adjustment and the location of the transition between the two regimes. is, indeed, a mixture of the two correlation matrices 1 and 2 . When ( − − ) is large and positive, is close to 1 and nears 2 , and when ( − − ) is large and negative, is close to 0, and nears 1 2 .
In the DSTCC-GARCH(1,1) model the conditional correlations vary according to two transition variables. They are parameterized as follows
with, as transition functions, the logistic functions 
The impact of the Greek financial turmoil on domestic nexuses
We use a data set of daily observations on sovereign and banks CDS 5 year spreads (the corresponding contract being the most liquid of the CDS market) and on the Greek and Italian sovereign spread, i.e. the differential between the yields of the Greek and Italian (BTP) 10 year sovereign bonds and of the German 10 year bund. Our panel consists of four large European countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, which accounted, in recent years, for 75% of the GDP of the EMU. Their net sovereign debt to GDP ratios differ significantly and range -in 2015 -from 119% in the case of Italy, to 89% for France, 65% for Spain and to 48% in the case of Germany. As we shall see the order of these ratios coincides with the ranking of the severity of the estimated impact of the Greek financial crisis on the national banks -sovereign nexuses.
The graphs of Figure 1 are highly informative. CDS premia vary substantially over the sample period and reflect the shifts in the probabilities of potential bond defaults that are priced by the market. In France and Germany sovereigns are perceived as substantially less risky than banks whereas in Spain and, especially in Italy, the CDS levels are alike. 3 The sheer dimension of the financial disequilibria hinders, in these countries, any public intervention in favor of distressed banks. The co-movements between CDS spreads on sovereign and bank bonds too change over time, and justify the stochastic correlation approach adopted hereafter.
<Insert Figure 1 about here> <Insert Table 1 
about here>
The statistics set out in Table 1 The standard tests, moreover, suggest that their distributions are non-normal (mostly leptokurtic) and conditionally heteroskedastic An analysis of the co-movement of these time series requires, therefore, the use of a multivariate GARCH procedure. Moreover, since the time period under investigation straddles large financial upheavals, an approach which accounts for shifts in the conditional correlations, such as the DCC-GARCH(1,1) of Engle (1992) or the STCC-GARCH(1,1) implemented in this paper, is called for.
<Insert Table 2 
The conditional correlations and the smooth transition parameters of equations (7) and (8) are set forth in Table 2 . Strongly significant from a statistical point of view, they have the appropriate size and the expected sign. 5 The usual misspecification tests performed using the standardized residuals, suggest that the quality of fit is adequate (E( ) = 0, E( 2 ) = 1 and conditionally homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated, for = 1, … , 3). Indeed, the BDS (2) and BDS(3) test statistics, resulting from BDS tests with embedding dimensions 2 and 3, fail to reject (with one exception only) the null that the standardized residuals are iid. The nonlinearities detected in the return time series of Table 1 are filtered away by the model. However, since the Jarque-Bera statistics systematically reject the null of normality, we compute the estimates using the robust QMLE procedure developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) .
<Insert Table 3 
To extract additional useful insights, in Table 3 we label as "contagious" the regime in which the transition function is larger than 0.5 and the conditional correlation -the nexus -is closer to its high extreme value 2 (regime 2) than to its low extreme value 1 (regime 1). The relative number of days spent in each regime and the relative dimension of the corresponding conditional correlations differ among countries. In Germany and France, the number of days in the "no contagion" regime is from 6 to 7 times larger than the number of days in the "contagion" regime. In the latter, the size of the nexus rises by 65 percent in Germany and by 90 percent in France. In the peripheral countries of the sample, the results are less homogeneous. The number of days in the "no contagion" regime is only 3 times larger than the number of days in the "contagion" one in
Italy and 24 times larger in Spain. In the same way, the nexus in Italy increases by 60 percent in the "contagion" regime, in line with the increases in the core countries of the sample. This is not the case in Spain, where the rise in the nexus is huge (larger than 90 percent). It is noteworthy that the estimates repeated over the Greek-crisis subsample are qualitatively similar to the full sample ones, as the contagion phenomena turn out to occur mostly during the Greek financial turmoil.
<Insert Figure 2 about here>
Additional information is provided by the graphs of Figure 2 , where the nexuses are related to changes in the differences between Greek and German bond yields. The shape of the curves depends upon the values of the coefficient gamma (speed of adjustment variable) and c (threshold parameter) estimates in Table 2 . In Germany and France we detect a similar market psychology. This is not the case for Spain and Italy. Agents' reactions are strong and homogenous in Italy whereas they are slow and highly heterogeneous in Spain. In Italy traders have a common risk perception and react to small variations of the Greek German yield spread, in Spain an opposite behavior holds; the dimension of the public (rather than of banks') debt seems to be the discriminating factor in the risk assessment of bond traders. The larger the stock of sovereign debt the faster and more homogeneous is the positive shift in the pricing of risk and the smaller the absolute value of the Greek-German sovereign risk differential that triggers it. The differing patterns of reaction, detected in Figure 2 , reveal that the focus of the markets is on sovereign financial equilibrium, in line with the major policy recommendations of the European institutions.
The relevance of the Italian public debt
On the basis of the above considerations and taking into account the relevance of the systemic risk channel pointed out by Beltratti and Stultz (2017) , who notice that holdings of peripheral country bonds by core banks may not be a statistically and economically significant contagion channel, we extend our analysis introducing a second transition variable, the positive changes of the BTP Bund sovereign bond spread. 6 To give substance to the Italian channel hypothesis, we compute -using data from the BIS quarterly review -the share of the outstanding claims on Greek and Italian official sectors by German and
French banks with respect to their total claims on the foreign official sector. The findings, set out in Table 4 , support the view that, after 2011, Greece should not 6 Beltratti and Stultz (Table 2 , 2017), find that core country banks' net holding of bonds issued by Greece accounted for 4.99% of banks' market capitalization in 2010 (5.88% if normalized by banks' tangible equity). A year later these percentages were respectively 5.89% and 2.97%. As for bonds issued by Italy, the percentages were 18.45% and 19.69% in 2010, whereas in 2011 the figures rose to 27.15% in terms of market capitalization and fell to 9.19% in terms of tangible equity. The figures for Greece are quite small if compared to the severe turmoil generated by the so called "Greek crises".
be viewed as the unique source of contagion. The share of the Italian official sector claims reported by French and German banks seems to have magnified the effect of the Greek turmoil; the sheer size of the Italian public debt being able to transform tensions in the Italian sovereign sector into a threat to the survival of the euro area.
<Insert Table 4 
about here>
In order to account for the role of an additional highly indebted peripheral country, such as Italy, the STCC-GARCH(1,1) model has been extended by adding a second transition variable, the daily positive changes in the difference between the yields of the Italian 10 year BTP and of the German 10 year Bund.
The DSTCC-GARCH(1,1) model parameterized by equations (9), (10) and (11) of Section 2 is therefore estimated, where 1 and 2 are, respectively, the positive changes in the differentials between the Greek-German and ItalianGerman 10 year sovereign bonds yields, ∆ + and ∆ + .
<Insert Table 5 
The conditional correlations and the smooth transition parameters are set out in Table 5 . The estimates are significant from a statistical point of view and have the appropriate size and the expected sign. 7 The usual misspecification tests, performed using the standardized residuals, suggest that the quality of fit is adequate and the BDS(2) and BDS(3) tests fail to reject (with one exception only) the null that the standardized residuals are iid. The nonlinearities of the return time series of Table 1 are filtered away by the DSTCC-GARCH(1,1) model.
The estimates are performed using the robust QMLE procedure developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) , since the Jarque-Bera statistics systematically reject the null of normality. 8
The interaction of regimes 1 and 2 for the Greek-German and Italian-German transition variables produces the correlation tree sketched below.
The positive shifts of the Greek-German yield differential determine two regimes according to the positive changes of the sovereign spread being below or above a threshold value c1, each of which, in turn, can be associated with two regimes generated by positive shifts of the Italian-German yield differentials. We obtain in this way the four regime paths above, where the transitions from one regime to the other are modeled by smooth transmission mechanisms.
A perusal of the estimates of Table 5 shows that when both transition variables are in regime 1, the nexuses ( 12 11 , 13 11 ) are quite small. They increase substantially when the transition variable associated with the Italian debt is in regime 2
8 In appendix 2, is set out the graphical representation of system 2, with two transition variables. Starting from 2011, both in France and in Germany sovereign-banks correlations react to positive changes in the Italian-German sovereign yield spread. 2 ) seems to be due to multiple causes.
As for the estimated speed of convergence, 1 is always lower than 2 , which suggests that the Italian default risk is likely to trigger a much faster reaction of market agents. As for the threshold values c, they are not comparable since in Table 5 they refer only to positive changes of the Greek and Italian sovereign bond yields spread whereas in Table 2 both positive and negative changes are considered.
The results suggest that the two transition variables matter in both core countries, since concomitant positive changes of sovereign bond spreads determine a significant rise in the conditional correlations. In France, however, the behavior of the estimated correlation coefficient through regimes suggests that the role of the Italian debt be dominant, a result in line with the size of the outstanding claims of French banks towards Italian official counterparties (see Table 4 ).
Conclusions
The correlation nexuses between sovereign and banks CDS spreads are highly informative and provide new insights on the financial contagion triggered by the Greek crises. Using the STCC-GARCH methodology we find similar patterns of behavior in core countries (Germany and France) and strong dissimilarities in the so called peripheral ones (Italy and Spain). In the peripheral countries, the main driver of contagion is the perceived default risk of the sovereign issuer, which is linked to the size of the outstanding public debt; actually, Italian banks are hit by the Greek turmoil more severely than the Spanish ones. We extend, therefore, the model introducing a second transition variable related to the Italian public debt. We find that core countries nexuses are affected and increase in a significant way whenever the Italian-German ten years bond differential spread change rises above a regime threshold. This highlights the key role of the Italian sovereign debt on the tenability of the EMU project. However, it is the concomitant occurrence of tensions on the Italian and Greek sovereign bond markets that matters. Indeed, positive changes of the Italian spread exert a magnifying effect on the nexuses of core countries, especially in the case of France. 14] Notes. DsvC = daily rate of change of the CDS premium on sovereign bonds issued by country C, C = BD, FR, IT and SP; DbkB = daily rate of change of the CDS premium on bonds issued by bank B, B = DBK, ING, SGA, CAG, MPS, ISP, CAIXA and BBVA; ∆ = daily change of the VIX;GGsp: daily change in the spread between the yields of Greek and German 10 years bonds; ∆ + : positive daily change in the spread between the yields of Greek and German 10 years bonds; ∆ + : positive daily change in the spread between the yields of Italian and German 10 years bonds; Probability values in square brackets; Skew: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; AR(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the time series; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; BDS(k): z-test statistic, with embedding dimension k and Є value =.9, of the null that the time series, filtered for a first order autoregressive structure, is independently and identically distributed. Note. For each country, the sovereign-bank bonds CDS correlations are simple averages of the correlations between the rates of change of the spreads of sovereign bonds CDS and the rates of change of the spreads of the CDS of the bonds issued by the corresponding national banks. 
